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Powering the State:  
The political geographies of electrification in Mozambique 
 
 
Abstract: This paper explores the role of electricity infrastructures in helping to create, 
expand or limit the contours of the state in post-colonial Mozambique. Through a focus on 
recent electrification campaigns and attempts to improve sustainable energy access, we 
argue that the extension of electricity infrastructures helps to counter the state’s ‘blindness’ 
(Scott, 1998) and to provide a more permanent visibility for the state whilst potentially 
enhancing its capacity to order, arrange and ‘read’ its territory and citizenry (particularly in 
contested rural peripheries). We argue that the material and symbolic work of large-scale 
infrastructural works around rural electrification and grid extension constitute an important 
means through which the state performs and narrates its presence and role in order to gain 
meaning and importance in the lives of rural residents and to forge connections with them. 
Aside from extending the power and reach of state institutions and their territorial authority, 
we contend that the development of electricity infrastructures also helps to create 
neoliberal subjectivities and advance neoliberalisation whilst creating lucrative opportunities 
for elite accumulation. We examine the different forms of institutional, material and 
discursive power that influence why some ways of organising energy are privileged over 
others and reflect on the resulting implications for energy access inequalities and state-
citizen relations.  
 
Keywords: Mozambique, electricity, infrastructure, territory, the state 
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Introduction: energy, geopolitics and development 
“[on]e of the fundamental tasks of the State is to striate the space over which it reigns” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2002 [1980]: 385) 
 
The expansion of (sustainable) electricity access in Africa is increasingly hailed as 
fundamental to poverty eradication but in rolling out thousands of kilometres of electricity 
transmission lines, African states are also able to extend their reach and authority, to more 
effectively ‘striate the space’ over which they reign. Electricity infrastructures (and the 
capture and control of flows associated with them) help constitute the state as a visible 
actor in the everyday lives of rural people whilst the arrival of electricity affects state-citizen 
relationships in various ways (Winther, 2008).  As Mitchell (2011: 7) has shown, examining 
the socio-technical and political worlds built with energy resources and the social and 
material properties of electricity reveals a great deal about the different ways of engineering 
political relations and making political connections out of flows of energy but also about the 
impacts on existing hierarchies and inequalities in institutions and practices. Energy 
infrastructures, including electricity generation, transmission and distribution facilities, are 
sites of contestation and have played a significant role in processes of nation-building, 
modernization and development (Calvert, 2016) and in imaginations of national sovereignty 
(Huber, 2015).  
 
In Mozambique, the discovery of coal reserves estimated at more than 23 billion tonnes and 
gas deposits of more than 100 trillion cubic feet (IEA, 2014) has raised the prospect of 
massive resource wealth that could be used to address longstanding challenges of energy 
poverty as the extractives boom has begun to spur investments in domestic power 
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generation (Hanlon and Nuvunga, 2015). The costs and benefits of energy extraction and 
generation have however been experienced unevenly both socially and spatially and despite 
plentiful energy resources, Mozambique faces the paradoxical situation of widespread and 
persistent domestic energy poverty (Kirshner and Power, 2015). Although estimates vary, 
the country has some of the lowest electrification rates in Africa along with acutely uneven 
geographies of electricity access, as the national grid reaches only about one fifth of its 23 
million inhabitants1 (World Bank, 2015).  
 
Electricity infrastructures represent an important physical medium through which to express 
state authority, to extend the reach of the state and its capacity to administer. Electricity has 
become a potent symbol of what the state can do for citizens, and in return it serves as an 
important instrument in generating state legitimacy. In this paper we argue that examining 
electricity infrastructures can uncover important features of the political ordering of space 
and provide valuable insights into emergent political geographies. Examining the nexus of 
energy, geopolitics and development in Africa, we suggest, is highly instructive and can 
reveal a great deal about how states come into effect or increase their visibility, how they 
seek to ‘read’ and translate their territories and citizens and how they enlist and enrol them 
in state-led projects of modernisation and development. For the state to take on meaning 
and importance in the lives of un-served rural residents and to forge connections with them, 
this process “not only has to be enacted through festivals or parades but must also 
command the attention of citizens through large-scale [infrastructural] efforts as part of 
what characterizes the state as something that stands apart from society” (Harris, 2012:39). 
From the wires, poles, and generators themselves to the entrepreneurs, engineers, 
                                                                 
1 Firewood and charcoal make up to 81% of the total energy consumed in Mozambique (Cuvilas et al, 2010).  
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politicians, and donors who drive and determine the process of electrification, electrical 
grids can create power and politics just as they transmit it and can perform and enable (or 
disable) social formations in important ways (Shamir, 2013).  
 
In their study of clean energy development in Kenya, Newell et al (2014) highlight the ways 
different forms of power relations combine to determine the scope for enhanced energy 
access. This includes institutional power (where does power lie within and across 
government and how far is it reinforced or undermined by actors beyond the state, 
especially donors?); material power (who controls the finance, technology and means of 
producing electricity and ‘clean energy’) and discursive power (who defines what is regarded 
as clean, green and affordable energy, how are the energy needs of the poor represented 
and for whose benefit?) (Newell et al, 2014). Our analysis builds on this conceptual approach 
in tracing how these forms of power combine in the Mozambican context, while 
supplementing this with a focus on the spatiality of energy infrastructures. As the state is 
composed of multiple relations within and beyond national boundaries, we examine the 
spatial dynamics of state power in Mozambique, its territoriality and how it is brought to 
bear on energy systems.  
 
The paper adopts a political economy approach that examines the discourses, institutions 
and interests that influence electricity policy and provision and the implications for 
enhancing energy access. It examines the role of electricity infrastructures in extending the 
power and reach of the state, in narrating the state’s presence and in enabling  particular 
forms of elite accumulation and subject formation. We argue that electricity provision in 
Mozambique plays an important role in statecraft and provides accumulation opportunities 
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for governing elites. Further, we suggest electrification is a transnational governmental 
project embroiled in colonial histories and geographies, in strategies of neoliberalisation and 
in efforts to attract foreign exchange and investment.  
 
The paper begins by introducing the key features of Mozambique’s energy system. The 
second section sets out our conceptualisation of the state in Mozambique and provides a 
brief overview of the recent literature on the intersections between electricity and the state 
in Africa, while also drawing on examples from industrialized states . A third section 
introduces our methodology and sets out the context for our research before we then 
examine the particular configuration of institutional and material power guiding 
electrification efforts in Mozambique, the accumulation opportunities it creates, and the 
interests it serves for those connected to the party-state. A final section examines how, 
under the cover of rural electrification, the state has  sought to extend its reach and 
authority and enhance the power of its institutions along with the role that electrification 
plays in extending the market, in wider neoliberalisation and in creating regular bill-paying, 
neoliberal consumer-subjects. The conclusion reflects on the prospects for transforming the 
colonial spatialities of Mozambique’s energy system and for extending energy access. 
 
Mozambique’s energy system 
 
Mozambique’s electricity system (see figure one) has developed as a patchwork of three 
separate systems that lack interconnection, particularly between the southern and central 
systems, along with an ageing transmission system and a distribution network that connects 
all administrative centres but leaves large swathes of the country without a power grid 
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(World Bank, 2015). The central and northern provinces depend largely on a single 
transmission line, such that one failure is enough to cut electricity to vast regions of the 
country. Most facilities are owned and operated by Electricidade de Mocambique (EDM), the 
state-owned electricity utility founded in 1977, two years after national independence. At 
the time electricity access was confined to the capital city, Lourenço Marques (today 
Maputo) and provincial centres, with generation from a series of small municipal diesel 
generators, a coal fired power station and small hydro-power plants along with the Cahora 
Bassa hydroelectric dam project constructed in the dying days of Portuguese colonialism 
(Cuamba et al, 2013). EDM integrated these previously dispersed production units inherited 
from the colonial period and began expanding the grid, but after decades of 
underinvestment many of the facilities are now obsolete or requiring rehabilitation (Cipriano 
et al, 2015). 
 
Hydropower has been the main source of electricity supply in Mozambique to date, 
accounting for 95% of total generation (Cipriano et al, 2015). EDM´s available generation 
capacity comes from Cahora Bassa and several smaller hydropower facilities (Corumana, 
Mavuzi and Chicamba), yielding roughly 565 MW in total (Cipriano et al, 2015). Since 2011, 
with increased demand from the domestic population, load has exceeded this capacity, 
creating the need for Independent Power Producers (IPPs) or costly imports from within the 
Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)(ibid). In order to meet the projected growth in demand, 
the state has increasingly begun to outsource for energy provision through the licensing and 
divestment of generation operations to IPPs, several of which seek to use newly-exploited 
hydrocarbon resources to construct new coal- and gas-fired power plants linked to the grid 
network, increasing supply but also prices  (Nhamire and Mosca, 2014).  
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After the adoption of Marxism-Leninism, Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique or 
the Mozambique Liberation Front) moved quickly to centralise economic and political 
control so that the state could be harnessed for the task of modernizing the nation (cf. 
Pitcher, 2002). Throughout the post-liberation period Frelimo has prioritised national unity 
and the expansion of territorial control (Bertelsen, 2016) with the extension and control of 
electricity infrastructures regarded as one means to achieve this. During Mozambique’s 
devastating Civil War (1977-1992) the promise of electrification accompanied Frelimo’s 
campaign to persuade peasants to join the communal villages that were the centrepiece of 
its socialist ideology (Geffray, 1991) while the South African-backed counter-revolutionary 
militia Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) specifically targeted key infrastructures 
(including electricity) for attack as a means to confront and “dehierarchize” the emerging 
state order (Bertelsen, 2016: 39).  
 
As early as 1981, Renamo forces dynamited pylons near Espungabera in Manica province on 
the border with Zimbabwe, reducing electricity exports by 50% (AIM, 1981) and during the 
war itself, Renamo repeatedly sabotaged the dam’s power lines , as the state lacked the 
capacity to protect the 4,000 pylons which cut across 900km of remote countryside, 1400 of 
which were destroyed by Renamo in 1988 alone (Anderson, 2016). The cost of repairing the 
power lines was estimated at US$500 million—almost three times the total value of 
Mozambican exports (Isaacman and Sneddon, 2003).  
 
Mozambique’s electricity infrastructure remains heavily oriented towards resource 
extraction and regional markets—given the government’s need for foreign exchange derived 
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from these exports—and its development has been shaped by colonial experiences and the 
extractive mercantilist capitalism that structured the colonial economy (Castel-Branco, 
2010). At the centre of Mozambique’s electricity system is the Cahora Bassa dam,  completed 
in 1974 on the Zambezi in the northern province of Tete (see Figure 1). Hailed as a testimony 
to Portugal’s ‘civilizing mission’ and framed in high modernist ideology, the dam was billed 
as a means of extending Portugal’s colonial territorial reach and authority. Construction 
began in 1969 with the project financed by the sale of cheap electrical power to South Africa 
in exchange for support in the colonial war (Isaacman and Isaacman, 2013; 2015).  
 
During the 1960s, Frelimo waged a guerrilla campaign to block construction of the dam, but 
it was completed just six months prior to Mozambican independence and the newly-
installed Frelimo government had little alternative but to discard its long-term opposition 
and ‘domesticate the white elephant’ as President Samora Machel put it, seeking to turn an 
exploitative colonial project into a national asset, a symbol of liberation which would be 
instrumental in the ‘socialisation of the countryside’. Hidroeléctrica Cahora Bassa (HCB), the 
state-owned company which manages the dam and sells power to EDM, began operations in 
1977, supplying power to the Mozambican, Zimbabwean and South African grids through 
power purchase agreements. HCB ownership, agreed in 1975, gave the Portuguese state an 
82% stake and it was not until 2007 that HCB passed from Portuguese to Mozambican state 
ownership when Portugal, needing funds to reduce its budget deficit to meet EU regulations, 
agreed to sell most of its equity. With the return of Cahora Bassa, hailed at the time by 
President Armando Guebuza as a ‘second independence’ (IOL, 2006), expectations rose that 
Mozambique would prioritize its own energy needs and reverse the dam’s ‘enclave’ nature 
(Isaacman and Isaacman, 2013). The Mozambican state now owns 92.5% of HCB but plans to 
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sell 7.5% of shares on the stock market with the remaining 7.5% being held by the recently 
privatised Portuguese energy company REN (AllAfrica, November 28th 2017).  
 
HCB also plans to expand its regional markets to include Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania (Ibid). 
Around 65% of HCB’s production, or 1500 MW of electricity, is currently exported at well 
below market price via the Apollo substation outside Pretoria, with a portion re-imported 
into southern Mozambique on lines owned by South African utility Eskom (Sebitosi and Da 
Graca, 2009). Electricity in Mozambique is thus a transboundary issue with several 
neighbouring states importing electricity from Cahora Bassa. According to some observers, 
Cahora Bassa is the world’s largest dam constructed for the specific purpose of exporting 
energy (Isaacman and Isaacman, 2015). This internationalisation of electricity - the transfer 
across national borders of electric power and the fuel, capital and ownership required to 
generate it – makes it vulnerable to many of the same strategic concerns linked to oil , 
including disruption of supply, volatile prices, and struggles over control of resources and 
infrastructures (Bridge and LeBillon, 2013).  In the next section we review the literature that 
guides our theorisation of the state in Mozambique and informs our analysis of how 
electricity infrastructures and electrification initiatives not only enable particular forms of 
state power and (neoliberal) subjectivity but also serve elite interests and accumulation 
strategies both nationally and transnationally. 
 
Electricity and the State 
 
Despite calls to rethink the state ‘as a social relation’, reified understandings that view  the 
state as a differentiated institutional realm separate from civil society have persisted in 
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academic and political debate (Painter, 2006). Feminist, anthropological, and 
poststructuralist approaches have however begun to reorient attention away from formal 
state institutions toward socially embedded processes through which ideas of the state are 
reproduced. States do not simply exist; rather, they are accomplishments reified and 
reformulated through everyday activities (Painter, 2006). Understanding the mundane and 
prosaic practices through which ‘the state’ becomes  present in everyday life reveals their 
“heterogeneous, constructed, porous, uneven, processual and relational character” (Ibid: 
754). In the case of Mozambique, Bertelsen (2016) identifies novel entry points into 
understanding the state, locating state formation in disparate domains (e.g. sorcery, 
informal markets, gendered corporalities, spirit possession, and lynchings). We contend that 
electricity flows and consumption are also important in the everyday spaces of state power 
and represent a key means through which Mozambican state formation is enacted and 
contested in daily life. Sharing Bertelsen’s (2016: 270) reading of the Mozambican state as 
“an incomplete and beleaguered mode of organization”, as “perpetually unfolding” (Ibid:9) 
and as always emerging and becoming, we argue that electricity infrastructures constitute 
an important way in which the state is enacted, unfolds, emerges and comes into being. 
 
State power is in part the capacity of infrastructures to order, arrange and make legible 
(Scott, 1998). High-modernist infrastructure schemes established to enhance electrification 
and promote energy for ‘development’, given their associations with scientific and 
technological ‘progress’, expanding production, mastery of nature and the rational design of 
social order, represent an important part of the ways in which the state performs and 
narrates its presence and comes into being as a ‘socio-natural effect’ (Harris, 2012). Scott 
(1998: 2) writes of the ‘blindness’ of the state and about legibility as “a central problem of 
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statecraft”, the gradual resolution of which enables the state to get a better handle on its 
subjects and their environment through a more permanent visibility that assures the 
automatic functioning of power. Building on this work, we contend that the extension of 
electricity infrastructures helps with the process of seeing (and being seen to act) like a 
state. Electrification may not always improve a state’s ability to measure, record and 
monitor its territory and citizenry but it can be understood as one of many attempts made 
by the state to achieve greater visibility and to ‘read’ or ‘translate’ its territory and citizenry. 
Extension into previously un-electrified space is regarded as a way of enhancing the state’s 
capacity to administer and allows the state to project and amplify its authority and reach 
more people.  
 
Technologies and infrastructures are not merely symbols or tools for political expression; 
rather, they are a political terrain for the negotiation of moral-political questions, and it is in 
the politics of electricity infrastructures that such questions are negotiated and contested 
(von Schnitzler, 2013). In this sense, it is important to examine how infrastructure matters 
politically (Meehan, 2014) and how it comes to mediate a diversity of political projects and 
conflicts concerning questions around, for example, basic needs, political recognition or the 
rights and obligations of citizenship. The idea that objects—including all types of tools, 
beings, and things—are pivots for socio-political inquiry is prominent in science and 
technology studies and gaining traction in political ecology, anthropology and geography 
(Meehan, 2014). Infrastructure “helps create, destroy, expand or limit the contours of what 
we call the state” (Meehan, 2014: 216). Electricity infrastructures can (in their partiality) 
limit the jurisdiction of the state but they can also sustain modern societies and generate 
political and economic difference among groups and individuals (Shamir, 2013). Their 
12 
 
topologies of connection and isolation create new publics and political identities but also 
spaces for resistance (Luque-Ayala and Silver, 2016).  
 
Extending electricity services to households means extending ‘progress’ through the range of 
appliances and household items that claim to improve quality of life and allow people to 
participate in “what is considered a modern lifestyle” (Labban, 2012: 389). Electrification is 
therefore a process that guarantees “dual access”: peoples’ access to electricity and thus to 
modernity, but also the access of the market to more people “expanding quite literally with 
the extension of the electric grid” (Labban, 2012: 389). Novel forms of prepayment are seen 
to widen access to utilities (including electricity) in low-income areas and empower citizens, 
especially the poor but they also help to advance neoliberal-style reforms while using an 
empowerment narrative, seeking to discipline consumers, and often benefiting only 
privatized service providers (see McDonald, 2009; Baptista, 2015). This is particularly 
relevant in Mozambique where, from 2005, EDM introduced Credelec, a system of prepaid 
electricity to consumers extending to all the district town seats , whilst 88% of EDM clients 
connect to the grid through a prepaid meter (Baptista, 2015; 2017). In this way 
electrification enables the state to enrol its citizens as bill-paying consumers, as neoliberal 
subjects. Beyond this, the materiality of its infrastructure gives electricity a centralising 
effect. Power plants that generate electricity and distribute it through a broad network 
centralise command over the network, the flow of electricity through it, and “the 
accumulation of money flowing in the opposite direction” (Labban, 2012: 390).  
 
Although there is now a growing literature on electricity in the global South that considers its 
“dialectical relationship to social infrastructures and political institutions” (Gupta, 2015: 
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563), relatively few contributions have explicitly considered the relationships between 
electricity and the state in Africa. Winther (2008) argues that the arrival of electricity affects 
the state-citizen relationship in crucial ways and that grid extension in rural Zanzibar in the 
1980s and 1990s provided the state with an efficient new mechanism for strengthening its 
political control over the population (Winther and Wilhite, 2015). Anthropologists in 
particular have argued that the coming of electricity in Africa shapes everyday lives, spaces 
and temporalities, illustrating how it can conceptually and materially bridge the gap 
between centre and periphery, as people and places redefine their position within 
discourses of modernity and development (Ibid). Degani (2016) analyses the ad hoc nature 
of the electricity sector in postsocialist Tanzania as symptomatic of tenuous political and 
neoliberal reforms, which rather than empowering citizens require them to develop their 
own ‘provisional pathways’ of electrical power as best they can.  
 
In many studies of electrification in Africa, the process is viewed apolitically, as a largely 
technical and logistical process of widening connections and ‘plugging’ consumers into a grid 
infrastructure. Electrification is understood here as part of the ‘will  to improve’ underpinning 
development interventions and exemplifies the practice of ‘rendering technical’ (Li, 2007) 
where energy access is depicted as a series of technical ‘problems’ responsive only to a 
‘development’ intervention while rendered non-political as experts concerned with 
improvement exclude political-economic relations from their diagnoses and prescriptions  
through a subliminal and routine ‘anti-politics’ (Ferguson, 1990). Moreover, many current 
policy interventions in African energy systems rarely consider the colonial and postcolonial 
histories that have shaped the energy systems they are seeking to expand or upgrade 
(Baptista, 2017). Although power sector reform has figured prominently in the literature, 
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there is often a failure to consider how electricity infrastructures and programmes serve 
elite interests and enable strategies of accumulation. The capitalist state is extensively 
involved in the electricity business through ownership, funding, development, regulation 
and protection of markets, and even though electricity distribution presents a collective 
action challenge and is regarded as a public service and a responsibility of government, 
private actors have become increasingly involved in shaping infrastructure that is ostensi bly 
‘public’ with electricity continually regarded as a ‘private good’.  
 
Two of the most useful concepts to have emerged in critical scholarship that has considered 
the state’s entanglements with electricity in Africa are that of a  minerals-energy complex 
(MEC) (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996) and ‘electric capitalism’ (McDonald, 2009). The MEC 
refers to a regime of accumulation developed in apartheid South Africa based on low cost 
state-owned electricity production via the public utility Eskom, cheap labour and large-scale 
national and international corporate capital tightly bound to the energy and mining sector.  
This work emphasizes the historical relationship between the state and capital in ways that 
are highly relevant to Mozambique, as is the idea of providing industry with heavily 
subsidised electricity “at the expense of social and environmental sustainability.”  This 
relationship underpins what McDonald (2009: 438) calls ‘electric capitalism’ in Southern 
Africa. The circulations of capital and accumulation strategies that electrification enables are 
multiple however whilst the political economies of electrification in Mozambique are shaped 
not just by a regional MEC but also by supply arrangements with South Africa and Eskom’s 
needs as well as through the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP) which co-ordinates 
electricity trade in the region.  
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Several studies of the connections between electricity and political power undertaken in 
highly industrialized contexts are also relevant here. Geographers, sociologists and historians 
of technology have examined the ways that networks of electricity infrastructure are deeply 
implicated in the reproduction of political and economic power (Hughes, 1993). For example, 
Granovetter and McGuire (1998: 149) examine the formation of the electricity industry in 
the US in the early 20th Century. They show how its specific form and structure emerged, not 
because it was the most technically and economically efficient, but because a set of 
powerful actors accessed certain techniques and applied them “in a highly visible and 
profitable way”. This process triggered pressures for uniformity across all regions of the US, 
even when it excluded viable alternative technologies and organizational forms, such as 
decentralized provision, or co-generation systems, in homes and factories. Harrison (2013) 
examines the uneven development of electricity networks in North Carolina in the US South, 
and the centralization of capital into a single provider along with implications for energy 
poverty and injustice. Going further, Harrison (2016) traces the use of racial categories in 
rural electrification planning in North Carolina during the New Deal 1930s, analysing the 
ways in which race was used to readjust projections of electricity consumption and the 
planning of distribution lines, strategically keeping some areas un-electrified. 
 
Collectively, these different literatures inform our approach by enabling us to conceptualise 
the state relationally, as incomplete, emergent and becoming and as processual, socially 
embedded and uneven. They allow us to trace how electricity infrastructures and 
electrification initiatives constitute an important way in which the state is enacted in and 
through everyday spaces but also how they become part of the state’s attempts to order, 
arrange and translate its territory and citizens, to make them more legible. Finally, the focus 
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on the national and regional political economies of electricity infrastructures (and how they 
are shaped by material, discursive and institutional forms of power) (Newell et al, 2014) 
informs our analysis of how electrification serves elite interests and enables strategies of 
accumulation but also how it allows the state to enrol its citizens as bill-paying subjects of 
neoliberal capitalist development.  
 
Setting the context: methods and approach 
 
Our research formed part of a larger project on the ‘Rising powers’ and low carbon energy 
transitions in Southern Africa (Power et al, 2016). . The initial aim of our research was to 
examine the ways in which (re) emerging economies, specifically Brazil, India and China, 
have influenced energy pathways in southern Africa through various roles, investments and 
interventions. This research was concerned with the political economy of energy transition 
and involved examining the discourses, institutions and interests that influence electricity 
policy and provision in Mozambique. It quickly became clear that the Mozambican state 
views energy as an important physical medium to achieve its political objectives and that 
energy access discourses were geopolitically framed and imagined. We thus set out to 
examine the extent to which state-led electrification initiatives are embroiled in long-term 
state building projects and come to symbolise the reach of state power, enabling certain 
forms of subject formation and elite enrichment.  
 
Methodologically, the paper draws on two phases of multi-sited fieldwork conducted in 
Mozambique in September to November 2013 and July to August 2014. In the first phase, 
data were gathered through 75 in-depth interviews with officials from the state-owned 
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electricity provider, EDM, FUNAE (a smaller state agency charged with off-grid rural 
electrification), several government ministries (including those for Natural Resources and 
Energy, Environmental Management, Foreign Affairs, and Planning and Development) and 
other state agencies (such as the Centre for Investment Promotion). We conducted further 
interviews with donor organizations, diplomatic staff, small businesses and NGOs engaged 
with the energy sector to get a sense of the wider non-state discourses and narratives 
around electrification and energy access and to triangulate them with those articulated by 
public officials. In these interviews, we sought information on institutional histories, energy 
development priorities, investment strategies, donor engagements and locational 
characteristics. In addition to mapping the particular institutional and material configuration 
of power around electricity our primary objective was to explore the (highly political) 
process of narrating expanding energy access and so discourse analysis was used to critically 
interpret the interview materials. 
 
In the second phase and working in partnership with the NGO Practical Action (through its 
Harare, Zimbabwe office), we carried out extended site visits to six off-grid energy service 
projects in Maputo, Manica and Zambézia Provinces, and a solar equipment assembly plant 
outside the capital city, Maputo. Return visits in 2015 and 2017 enabled several follow-up 
interviews. During these visits, we observed the ways in which energy resources, 
technologies, infrastructures and demand are configured in different parts of the country 
beyond the capital city. As Bertelsen, (2016: 4) has noted of Mozambique, it is:  
 
18 
 
“worthwhile to pursue how postcolonial state formation is imagined and experienced 
from its margins—that is, from provinces beyond Maputo and from circumstances of 
impoverishment external to the powerful centers of political and economic elites”.   
 
We thus wanted to explore not just how the state regards electricity infrastructures as a 
means to advance state formation but also of better ‘connecting’ citizens at its margins to 
these centres of political and economic power. In doing so, we sought to get a sense of how 
the state understood electrification infrastructures as a means to increase its visibility and 
enhance its power to govern, administer and order rural areas  and how electrification 
affected state-citizen relations.  
 
We also draw on archival research conducted at the Mozambican News Agency (Agência de 
Informação de Moçambique, AIM), extensive desk-based studies and our earlier involvement 
in a variety of research projects based in Mozambique to understand the broader energy 
and political histories at play in the country. The authors are proficient in Portuguese and 
the analysis that follows is based on extensive experience in researching the political 
economy of Mozambique over many years. Our partners in Practical Action speak fluent 
Sena, Shona and Chichewa, indigenous languages spoken in the regions where the site visits 
took place. In what follows, we draw on these methods to explore how electrification has 
become a means through which the state seeks to establish political authority and counter 
its ‘blindness’ in peripheral spaces whilst enabling elite accumulation. 
 
Electricity, capitalism and state power 
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Mozambique’s configuration of institutional power is focused on the ruling party Frelimo, 
which following liberal transition after the end of civil war in 1992 has consolidated its hold 
whilst the party’s effective monopolization of access to donors and international networks , 
together with the privatization process (cf. Castel-Branco, 2014; Hanlon, 2004) have enabled 
it to blur the lines between party and state and to “centralize wealth and power in ways that 
were impossible under socialism” (Sumich, 2010: 681). Privatization has helped to create a 
small national business class linked to the party and after winning all five post-war elections 
Frelimo, as an elected one-party state, has been able to monopolise power, rents and rent-
seeking (Macuane, Buur and Monjane, 2017).  It is important however to avoid the tendency 
to reduce the state to a “one-dimensional mechanism of exploitation usurped and employed 
by self-serving elites” (Bertelsen, 2016: 14).  
 
In the party’s and ruling elites’ own understanding, Frelimo is the shaper of Mozambique’s 
contemporary history (Bertelsen, 2016), even the dono do país (owner of the country), and 
therefore acts as the major ‘arena of negotiation’, channelling demands and interests 
internally and imposing constraints on the ability of actors to operate independently of its 
structures (Sumich, 2010:681).  In this sense the postcolonial state acts “as a machinery to 
thwart and tap cycles of exchange and extract life substances” (Bertelsen, 2016: 224). This 
centralised rent management enables Frelimo to control economic development and 
investment opportunities and cut off independent accumulation outside the ruling coalition, 
with the aim of strangling the political opposition. This has been further accentuated by a 
shift from an inclusive and decentralized political settlement after the General Peace 
Agreement in 1992, under President Chissano, to a more exclusive and centralized one 
under President Guebuza, but also by the resource boom over the past two decades, which 
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has intensified this distribution of power (Macuane, Buur and Monjane, 2017; Castel-Branco, 
2014). Local companies, often linked to key Frelimo figures mixing political, commercial and 
regional interests, have scrambled to tie up deals in infrastructure, and in supply and service 
contracts related to the extractive industries and emerging mega-projects (cf. Chivangue and 
Cortez, 2015; Macuane, Buur and Monjane, 2017). For example, Intelec and Insitec, firms 
which are directly or indirectly associated with the Guebuza family, have interests spanning 
infrastructure, construction, energy, banking and real estate (Castel-Branco, 2014).  
 
At the centre of energy policy formulation around oil, gas and coal in Mozambique, is the 
Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy (MIREME). Enjoying “privileged access to 
information on the country’s natural resources” (Interview, European Commission 
Delegation to Mozambique, September 17th, 2013), some senior MIREME officials 
(appointed by Frelimo) have established companies that can service the extractive industries 
and related infrastructure developments The institutional power of MIREME is also 
reinforced by alliances with transnational actors such as mining and energy conglomerates, 
but also by foreign donors who have endorsed plans for mega projects and infrastructure 
developments, in the gas, coal, aluminium, heavy sands, and related sectors (Chivangue and 
Cortez, 2015). The result is a particular hegemonic vision of how the country’s energy needs 
can best be addressed and the promotion of a particular mode of accumulation centred on 
extractive industries and infrastructural activity that advances elite interests (Büscher, 2009; 
Kirshner and Power, 2015).  
 
Key to this vision are high-modernist plans, developed through MIREME, for the construction 
of several large-scale hydropower facilities. The state has actively sought foreign investment 
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to catalyse these projects (which also require increases in transmission capacity) so as to lure 
energy-intensive industries and boost regional electricity exports  (Interview, African 
Development Bank, November 1st, 2013). This is also part of Frelimo’s wider promotion of 
national unity, securing its consent to stay in power, while countering recent calls from 
opposition party Renamo for autonomous governance at the provincial level, particularly in 
the four provinces it won in the 2014 national elections (see Cahen, 2015). These large hydro 
facilities (see figure one for locations) are also intended to showcase Mozambique’s recent 
economic growth and its impending modernity for both citizens and foreign investors whilst 
enabling the state to make its presence felt in rural regions. 
 
The largest hydroelectric scheme is the 1500 MW capacity Mphanda Nkuwa dam, sited 60 
km downstream from Cahora Bassa which is estimated to cost US$4.2 billion, and with the 
transmission system needed to export power costed at a further US$1 billion (World Bank, 
2015).  Although information in the public domain about the projects has been very minimal, 
investment is mostly coming from China’s Exim Bank in collaboration with private-sector 
Brazilian construction conglomerate Camargo Corrêa, the Mozambican investment company 
Energia Capital (a subsidiary of Insitec, linked to former President Guebuza) and EDM (TBY, 
2016). Once completed, about 75% of the generated power will be sold to Eskom with 15% 
to Zimbabwe and the remaining 10% used for domestic consumption with the justification 
given that Mozambique has only a limited transmission infrastructure available to distribute 
electricity across rural areas (Ibid). The project, in the works since 2013, was originally 
tendered, without public competition, to a consortium composed of EDM (20%); Insitec 
(40%) and Camargo Corrêa (40%) (Nhamire and Mosca, 2014). Projected to displace 1400 
households and indirectly affect the livelihoods of a further 200,000 Mozambicans , 
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Mphanda Nkuwa represents a startling example of ‘post-colonial amnesia,’ as the memory 
of displacement and ecological damage from Cahora Bassa is erased (Isaacman and 
Sneddon, 2003: 38-9).  
 
Another key institutional actor in the electrification process is the state-owned utility EDM. 
According to Carlos Yum, chair of EDM’s board of governors, the agency is a “development 
pillar” of Mozambique, working “for all Mozambicans” as part of the fight against poverty 
(Yum, 2017). EDM’s control over electricity provision gives it considerable material power to 
shape Mozambique’s evolving energy pathway. Combining donor support and foreign 
investment, EDM has expanded the grid network significantly starting in the mid-1990s 
(Interview, EDM, November 8th, 2014). Like MIREME, EDM cooperates with foreign investors 
in support of new opportunities developing in the extractive industries and fossil-fuel based 
power generation. State control of EDM is most visible in areas like the setting of electricity 
tariffs where the promise of free or subsidized electricity is used by the state to win political 
support (e.g. in election campaigns) whilst the state has also protected public institutions 
(including the Armed Forces) that have run up debts for the electricity they consume by 
intervening locally or centrally to prevent EDM from cutting off supply to enforce payment 
(Nhamire and Mosca, 2014). Overstretched by rising demand and with high levels of debt 
and considerable operating losses, EDM is also understaffed, lacking the technical staff to 
cope with regular grid operations and maintenance while working on an ambitious new 
connection2 programme (Cipriano et al, 2015).  
                                                                 
2 Between 2011 and 2014 EDM connected around 120,000 households per year but would need to connect an 
additional 57,000 households above its current rate each year to meet the government’s 50% access target by 
2023 (World Bank, 2015). Mozambique needs to add between 300,000 and 400,000 customers, in addition to 
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Critics accuse EDM of eliding its corporate mission and social responsibility of supporting the 
public interest by outsourcing its duties to companies linked to Frelimo elites via public 
tenders. This fits a broader pattern of neopatrimonialism involving personalized networks 
and relations, in which senior government officials have established private companies that 
can service the electricity sector (Chivangue and Cortez, 2015). EDM officials have also often 
set up independent companies to provide the goods and services required for its 
electrification process, and at the local level there is evidence that EDM has become a 
source of petty corruption involving company technicians (Nhamire and Mosca, 2014).  
 
Despite these accusations and critiques , EDM’s operations as a state-owned company are 
guided by its “social mandate” to extend connections  domestically (Interview, EDM, 
February 2nd, 2017). This extends from the historical role of EDM and HCB as public 
companies during the period of socialist planned economy (Baptista, personal 
communication, May 16, 2017). In rural and peri-urban areas lacking coverage, most 
households are “not profitable, at least in the first five years” (Ibid). Also, most domestic 
consumers in Mozambique are not energy intensive, adding further challenges for EDM to 
extend service in a way that covers costs. Meanwhile, pursuing this social mandate exists in 
tension with the state’s goal of positioning Mozambique as an energy exporter. 
 
Given the recent shift towards IPPs, EDM has begun to outsource for energy provision, 
frequently without open competition or public tendering (Nhamire and Mosca, 2014). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
those being connected by EDM, to achieve universal access by 2030 and meet its Sustainable Development 
Goals (World Bank, 2015; interview with Joaquim Ouchim, EDM, November 8 th, 2014). 
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Through EDM and MIREME, the state has joined a range of multinational firms such as the 
Brazilian mining multinational Vale and the Scottish power generation company Aggreko, to 
build industrially-oriented generation facilities (Cipriano et al, 2015). One example of this, a 
new 120MW gas-fired power station at Ressano Garcia, located on the South African border, 
is owned by Gigawatt Mozambique, in which Intelec (minority owned by former President 
Guebuza) has a 26% stake (MacauHub, 2016). Through these IPP projects, Frelimo’s political 
and business elites engage in profit-making opportunities around new energy generation 
projects, largely for their own benefit.  
 
These wider national and regional political economies around electricity infrastructures 
reveal a great deal about how electrification projects come to serve elite interests and 
enable strategies of accumulation that further entrench the Frelimo party-state and its hold 
on power. Yet, such projects do little to address the enormous inequalities in electricity 
access or to increase affordability, with industry receiving abundant cheap power while the 
poor majority remains off-grid, a situation common in much of Southern Africa (McDonald, 
2009). The export-orientation required by neoliberal models of capitalist development 
arguably further pushes many African states towards producing energy for export and away 
from serving the needs of the poor with some two-thirds of all energy investment on the 
continent devoted to producing energy for export and approximately half of current 
electricity consumption used for industrial activities – mostly mining and refining (IEA, 2014). 
 
.  
 
Statecraft and rural electrification  
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The national government’s Energy Strategy aims to reach 50% grid connectivity for the 
population by 2023 (Ministério da Energia, 2014) but this requires significant infrastructural 
investment (World Bank, 2015). Consequently, in recent years, the state has turned to 
decentralised generation in rural areas, partly motivated by recognition of the limits (and 
costs) of grid extension but also by donor priorities for addressing energy poverty and 
climate agendas (Interview, DFID Mozambique, October 13th, 2016).  
 
In part, these efforts reflect ongoing neoliberalisation in the electricity sector in African 
contexts (McDonald, 2009). Across the Global South, governments have unbundled and 
privatized large public utilities, facing pressure from lenders to reduce corruption and the 
clientelist distribution of services. Yet it is often unclear that political influence in the sector 
has been reduced; in some cases, the constellation of actors has expanded following 
privatization (Maclean and Brass, 2015). In contrast to the 1960s, when developmental 
states in Africa were the primary actors responsible for increasing energy access by 
expanding a centralized, national electric grid, the contemporary juncture of neoliberal 
globalisation has seen a growing range of private, non-state actors becoming involved with 
electrification and “NGO-business hybridisation” in the sector increasing (ibid: 59). Further, 
with decentralized and privatized solutions to energy poverty, it increasingly becomes the 
household’s responsibility to install renewables such as solar panels in homes, with the state 
withdrawing from energy provision (McDonald, 2009). In Mozambique, the World Bank has 
mediated this process, urging reform of the electricity sector and the mobilizing of private 
capital for the building of power plants, advocating tariff increases and the use of IPPs, while 
also encouraging off-grid approaches to accelerate energy access (World Bank, 2015). 
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The key institutional actor shaping the roll out of small-scale renewable energy in 
Mozambique is the National Energy Fund (FUNAE). Established in 1997 with Danish 
assistance, FUNAE operates under MIREME as the agency supporting rural energy, including 
electricity and fuel. Initially supplying diesel generators and kerosene, by the 2000s FUNAE’s 
focus had shifted to financing and supplying renewables, principally through solar PV 
systems and a small number of mini-hydro and pilot wind projects. The agency is funded 
through the state budget, with revenues from taxes and levies from petroleum and 
electricity concessions, along with donor support from the World Bank, the EU, several 
European bilateral donors, and more recently, India (Interview, FUNAE, November 3rd, 
2013). By agreement with EDM, FUNAE works in areas projected to be over 10 km from the 
grid network within five years (Interview, EDM, November 8th, 2014). Since the 2000s, 
FUNAE has partnered with several donor agencies in deploying RETs in projects for the 
provision of electricity for social uses in off-grid environments, such as school lighting, water 
pumping, and vaccine refrigeration. These projects use localised mini-grids or stand-alone 
systems that supply electricity for public services, including clinics, schools and teachers’ and 
nurses’ residences.  
 
FUNAE is a public agency, yet in some ways it has incorporated neoliberal thinking in its 
approach, joining donors and development agencies in discursively articulating rural 
electrification as an ‘enabler’ of rural development, propelling activities in agriculture, trade, 
industry, health and education, attracting new investments and improving livelihoods. 
Donors frequently articulate the notion that rural dwellers must quickly be brought into 
neoliberal modernity through a discourse of ‘connectivity,’ and that improved access to 
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modern energy services will lead to the extension of market exchange in rural areas (cf. 
Labban, 2012; Kale, 2014). FUNAE’s vision interpolates with these discourses in which off -
grid energy access is seen to champion the advance of the market in previously disconnected 
rural spaces, enabling a wider and unfettered dissemination of development (Kale, 2014). 
 
Despite its focus on decentralized energy, FUNAE operates mostly in a centralised, ‘top-
down’ fashion, with its headquarters and decision-making located in Maputo, whilst local 
communities receive energy and other infrastructure that is planned and decided by the 
state and investors. FUNAE’s procurement and supply-based model has succeeded in rolling 
out energy service projects to expand coverage, but often with limited local consultation or 
commitment to capacity building. The approach focuses on connecting rural institutions, 
such as government offices, clinics and primary schools, rather than providing direct access 
for households. The agency considers households connected if they live within a 20-km 
radius of these connected institutions (Interview, FUNAE Manica Office, November 3rd, 
2013). Local participation in shaping electrification, whether on-grid or off-grid, typically 
consists of a space in which non-state actors are invited to be ‘consulted’ or to give consent 
to an initiative, rather than proactively shape such a space (Castan Broto et al, 2014). 
 
During fieldwork, we observed that much of what FUNAE does is focused on the centralized 
delivery of electricity and seeks to strengthen the power of rural state institutions  while 
making the state’s presence felt among residents . Rural electrification in this sense is a 
means through which the state is enacted and comes into being in and through everyday 
spaces and infrastructures whilst enhancing the state’s institutional capacity to order, 
arrange and translate its territory and citizens and increase their legibility. Many projects 
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however rarely have connections that extend to a distance greater than 20 km and are 
seldom sited in the most remote areas of a district such that it is somewhat “fallacious to 
speak of rural electrification” (Nhamire and Mosca, 2014: 61). Others, however, view the 
electrification of rural schools and clinics as a substantial “step in improving rural wellbeing” 
in isolated contexts with limited capital investment and caution the need to be realistic 
about the available options (interview, Belgian Technical Cooperation, September 17th, 
2013). In Chinhambuzi, Manica province, a solar PV mini-grid, supported with Belgian 
finance and technical assistance, supplies electricity in the evenings for the local chief’s 
house, schoolteachers’ residences and four local shops, but ordinary residents remained 
disconnected. Several residents told us they considered connecting ‘spontaneously’, without 
FUNAE’s permission yet the system’s capacity would not support it, according to the FUNAE 
provincial director.  
 
In Mavonde, Manica province, local residents told us that most of the households who live 
far from the town centre—to be closer to their machambas (cultivated fields)—are unable 
to repay loans offered by FUNAE for installation of solar home systems (SHS) and have not 
benefitted from the project. Others felt the SHS created certain impositions, such as taking 
up space in their homes. Local entrepreneurs are encouraged to seek loans for new uses of 
energy such as freezing meat and fish, saving time and creating new commercial 
opportunities. In these projects, FUNAE has material power in centralising and controlling 
the supply of solar units from its Maputo headquarters, drawing criticism for impeding local 
enterprises insofar as it receives state subsidies and donor funds, crowding out competition 
(Interview with Boris Atanossov, September 17th, 2013). In establishing certain expectations 
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of project recipients (chiefly that they formally become bill paying consumers) the agency 
also plays a key role in the state’s fashioning of neoliberal subjectivities.  
 
In Majaua-Maia, Zambézia province, an EU-financed mini-hydro project has rehabilitated a 
hydraulic system used on a late colonial maize plantation in the 1960s and 1970s. Similarly, 
there was little participation in decision-making among residents in the delivery of 
electricity. In particular, the system bypassed a local mill, used by local women to grind corn 
for xima, a staple food. This was a priority among residents who spoke with us, as women 
must travel long distances to a diesel-powered milling facility, located across the Ruo River in 
Malawi. Local residents are expected to pay for the electricity service, without much 
consideration of their ability to do so, or how they will use the new electricity to meet their 
own needs. Nor was there consideration of the new expectations created, many of which 
require support, such as maintenance, service or training. 
 
The sociotechnical electricity infrastructures installed by FUNAE typically serve the more 
affluent in rural regions, such as shopkeepers, local officials and government workers, 
although the extent to which the rural poor have benefited remains unclear and requires 
further research. In FUNAE’s case, the installation process can be costly for customers and 
often overlooks local energy needs as the goal is mainly to bring electricity to the district 
town seats and administrative centres, to appear in government statistics that claim 
electrification to be a socially and spatially more inclusive effort than it is in practice.  
 
Narrating the methods and geographies of expanding energy access is a highly political 
process, with widely varying estimates of electrification rates highlighting its contested 
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nature. FUNAE uses the discursive power of the state, albeit shaped by donor priorities, in 
narrating expanding energy access and in deciding how the energy needs of the poor are 
represented and for whose benefit, along with what kinds of energy solutions are regarded 
as accessible and sustainable. What is rarely discussed explicitly, however, either by FUNAE 
or EDM, is who and how many benefit from rural electrification in the districts and towns as 
they are connected. Given the dispersed settlement patterns across much of rural 
Mozambique, many citizens are effectively bypassed. According to FUNAE officials and 
energy planners, the selection of host communities is based on technical feasibility and 
population size, although there appears to be little transparency in this process (Interview, 
FUNAE, October 31st, 2013).  
 
Conclusions:  Electrification, state power and neoliberal subjectivities 
 
The tentacles of electrification can be regarded as a central element of “modernity at large” 
(Appadurai, 1996, Winther and Wilhite, 2016). Similarly, for Ferguson (1999) the 
deterioration of the electricity system in Zambia was an icon of how people’s expectations of 
modernity came to falter. During the civil war in Mozambique Renamo regularly attacked 
electricity infrastructures as a way of contesting state claims to modernity and popular 
expectations of what the state could deliver. We have argued here that electricity 
infrastructures in Mozambique have helped to bring an incomplete and beleaguered state, 
one that is emergent and becoming, further into being whilst enabling it to extend the 
tentacles of state-led projects of modernity. Through these infrastructures and their 
extension into previously unelectrified space, the state has sought to perform and narrate its  
presence, to project and consolidate its territorial authority and to increase its visibility, 
especially in contested and peripheral areas where discontent and opposition party 
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challenges may be gathering momentum. They therefore constitute a highly contested 
political terrain that mediate a diversity of political projects and conflicts , helping to create 
and expand the contours of the state (or limit its jurisdiction). A variety of different 
electrification projects, from large-scale grid connected infrastructures to small-scale off-grid 
decentralised energy systems, constitute important forms of statecraft, doing the symbolic 
work of garnering support and legitimacy and demonstrating what the state can do for its 
citizens. We suggest that it is highly productive to examine the nexus between geopolitics, 
energy and development in Africa and to locate the study of everyday spaces of state power 
in and around electricity infrastructures as they represent a key means through which state 
formation is enacted and contested in daily life.  
 
One of Mahatma Gandhi’s critiques of electrical power was the worry that it would bring 
centralised control over the lives of people in remote villages and prevent communities from 
becoming self-sufficient for their energy needs (Kale, 2014:28). It is not the case however 
that the extension of electrical power has immediately brought more centralised control 
over people and places in Mozambique, but it is regarded by the state as a key means by 
which to perform and narrate development and improve its capacity to administer and 
govern its territory and citizens. Whilst the state has claimed that grid extension to rural 
spaces is a key priority, much infrastructural investment has focused on connecting urban 
and semi-urban district capitals and provincial centres whilst rural electrification has been 
focused not on improving household access but on enhancing the power and capacity of 
rural state institutions.  
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Electricity infrastructure represents an important means through which the state seeks to 
counter its ‘blindness’ in peripheral spaces  and although in Mozambique it hasn’t yet 
improved the state’s ability to measure, record and monitor, an expanding grid network and 
off-grid energy systems help the state to achieve a more permanent visibility, to extend the 
state’s presence and begin to enhance its power and capacity to order and arrange and to 
‘read’ and ‘translate’ its territory and citizenry. The intersections between electrification and 
statehood in Africa warrant further attention as does the contestation of electrical flows and 
infrastructures in ways that transform wider geometries of power. Mozambicans perhaps 
know better than most that infrastructures do not always work as expected, as 
demonstrated by the creative exploitation and micro-politics around prepayment technology 
or the theft of EDM-supplied electricity or of FUNAE-installed solar panels.   
 
The extension of electricity infrastructures also facilitate accumulation involving national 
political and economic elites in alliance with transnational actors. In Mozambique the 
monopolistic nature of grid-based electricity service provision has provided ample 
opportunities for rent-seeking and abuse, as the provision of electricity services is subject to 
political capture or the focus of patronage networks and petty corruption. Many of the 
prominent firms in infrastructure projects are linked to Frelimo officials mixing political, 
commercial and regional interests and capturing public resources and institutions to do so. 
Electrification in Mozambique represents a peculiar public-private project. Such hybrid 
constellations of state and non-state actors are becoming increasingly common in Africa in 
the wake of neoliberalisation, but the particular assemblages of actors they bring together 
and their impacts require further research, as does the way in which they are inflected by 
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each country’s particular political-economic history and through wider regional and global 
economies.   
 
Electricity infrastructures, we have argued, also help to enlist and enrol citizens as subjects 
of state-led modernity and development. We drew attention to the discursive power of state 
agencies like FUNAE in framing energy access problems and solutions and advancing the idea 
that rural energy users must quickly be brought into neoliberal modernity through a 
discourse of ‘connectivity’. The normative assumption is that all individuals should be 
connected to the grid, but the necessity and desirability of life on the grid are seldom 
questioned (Gupta, 2015) and little consideration is given to how poor people can afford to 
pay for it.  Energy access is framed as key to the extension and intensification of market 
exchange into rural areas, enabling and facilitating ‘development’  but the process also in 
part creates neoliberal subjectivities. Electrification allows the state to enrol its citizens 
within its vision of development as modern, bill-paying consumers and subjects (Baptista, 
2015; Labban, 2012). Ironically, however, in many ways the Mozambican state’s centralised 
and top-down approach to the supply and installation of decentralised energy in rural spaces 
has stifled and constrained private markets and actors.  
 
Particular ways of organising energy institutionally and geographically create new winners 
and losers (Mitchell, 2011). Access to electricity, both socially and spatially, remains acutely 
uneven and McDonald (2009: 445) even raises the prospect that Mozambique will remain 
‘trapped’ by a ‘colonial electrical geography’ in which poor majorities are excluded as the 
energy needs of corporations are placed above those of households and communities, 
especially in rural areas. Investment in power generation in Mozambique appears 
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disconnected from the basic energy needs of the poor and there is an assumption that the 
energy services most important to poor people will be delivered automatically as a by-
product of ambitious expansions in electricity generation capacity and electrification. Given 
the current configuration of institutional, material and discursive power within 
Mozambique’s energy sector the scope for rapid, large-scale and socially inclusive increases 
in energy access appears limited. The state’s ambitious plans and targets  are therefore 
unlikely to radically transform the colonial spatialities of the Mozambican energy system in 
the immediate future.  
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